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Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act
Often cited with the deference accorded a "general rule" is the
proposition that there can be no contribution among tortfeasors2
Merryweather v. Nixan 2 is said to be the case which first embodied
this doctrine. From an examination of that case it becomes apparent
that the enunciation of so broad a rule, if such a rule was enunciated,
was by way of dictum only, for the case itself is concerned with the
tortious acts of two wilful wrongdoers.3 "The reason [of the rule in
Merryweather v. Nixan] alleged is the technical one that any such
claim must be based on an implied contract between wrongdoers
and ... is necessarily illegal and void as being made in contempla-
tion of the commission of an illegal act." 4 It has been suggested 5
that the purported rule of the Merryweather case is a misstatement
and that Lord Kenyon actually declared an exception, that of wilful
wrongdoers, to the general proposition that "where two or more
persons are jointly or jointly and severally bound to pay a sum of
money and one or more of them are compelled to pay the whole or
more than his or her share those paying may recover from those
not paying the aliquot proportion which they ought to pay." 6 Cor-
rectly stated or otherwise, Merryweather v. Nixan is considered the
leading case on the issue of contribution among tortfeasors.
One exception to the rule of the Merryweather case was recog-
nized to the effect that a party induced by another to commit an act
ostensibly legal but, in fact, tortious had a right to indemnity from
his co-tortfeasor 7 But the English law on contribution among tort-
feasors remained unchanged from the Merryweather case until the
English Law Reform in 1935.8
The early Virginia case of Thweatt v. Jones 9 held that the rule
1 Union Stockyards v. Chicago B. & Q. Ry., 196 U.S. 217 (1905); Mary-
land Cas. Co. v. Gough, 146 Ohio St. 305, 65 N.E. 2d 858 (1946); Ash v. Mort-
ensen, 24 Cal. 2d 654, 150 P. 2d 876 (1944); RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 85
c. (1938); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 875 (1938).
2 8 T. R. 186 (K. B. 1799).
3 SALMOND, THE LAW OF TORTS 103 (7th ed. 1928); Reath, Contribution
Between Persons Jointly Charged for Negligence, 12 HARv. L. REV. 1T,6
(1898); Quarles, Contribution Between Joint Wrongdoers, 1 MARQ. L. REV.
141 (1917).
4 SALMOND, op. cit. supra note 3, at 103.
Reath, supra note 3; Quarles, supra note 3.
6 7 -Avr. & ENG. ENCYC. OF LAW 326 (2d ed. 1902).
7 Betts v. Gibbins, 2 A. & E. 57 (K. B. 1834).
8 England Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act, 25 &
26 GEORGE V, c. 30 § 6 (1935).
9 1 Rand. 328 (Va. 1823).
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of Merryweather v. Nixan did not apply to the commission of a
negligent tort, or quasi delict, and precipitated the still extant strug-
gle to relieve the negligent joint tortfeasor from the incubus of
total and final liability. Without the aid of statute, some states have
permitted contribution among joint tortfeasors when the tort is a
quasi delict,10 but many others-the federal court system, before the
Erie Ry. v. Tompkins 1 decision was included here-clung to the
"general rule." 12
In most fields of law where joint obligations are recognized, e.g.,
contracts,' 3 suretyship,' 4 and admiralty,' 5 the equitable doctrine of
contribution among joint obligors is the rule.
Several states have by legislation attempted to repeal this
anomalous doctrine and grant the right of contribution to certain
classes of tortfeasors. In none of these states has the wilful tort-
feasor been given the right to contribution. In some of the states
the right to contribution arises only after the rendition of a joint
judgment against the tortfeasors.1 In others a several judgment
may be used as the basis of a subsequent suit against a co-tort-
feasor."1 In Michigan, there is a right of contribution only among
co-tortfeasors who commit the tort of libel. 8 Such joint tort statutes
are usually implemented by a third party practice act, either already
a part of that state's procedural law or expressly passed in conjunc-
tion with the joint tortfeasor act. 9 The joint tort procedure of Wis-
consin, a sort of hybrid resulting from a cross between common law
and statute, is frequently singled out for approval.2 0 -
10 Underwriter v. Smith, 166 Minn. 388, 208 N. W. 13 (1926); Torpy v.
Johnson, 43 Neb. 882, 62 N. W. 253 (1895); Vandiver v. Pollak, 79 Ala. 467,
12 So. 473 (1893); Farwell v. Becker, 129 Il. 261, 21 N. E. 729 (1889); Nick-
erson v. Wheeler, 118 Mass. 295 (1875); note following Spaulding v. Oakes,
42 Vt. 343, 348 (1864).
11 304 U. S. 64 (1937).
22 Union Stockyards v. Chicago B. & Q. Ry., 196 U.S. 224 (1905); Gulf
& S. i R.R. v. Gulf Refining Co., 260 Fed. 262 (S.D. Miss. 1919); Central of
Ga. Ry. v. Swift & Co., 23 Ga. App. 346, 98 S.E. 256 (1918); Detroit Ry. v.
Boomer, 194 Mich. 52, 160 N. W. 542 (1916); Louisville v. Louisville Ry., 156
Ky. 141, 160 S. W. 771 (1913); Forsythe v. Los Angeles Ry., 149 Cal. 569, 87
Pac. 24 (1906).
13 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 119 (1932).
1" ARA=, SuRETYsHIP 333 (1931).
15 ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY 90 (1939).
16 MO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3658 (1942); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT, art. 2212
(Cum. Supp. 1948); N. Y. Crv. PRAc. ACT § 211 (a) (1939).
17PA. STAT. ArNN. tit. 12, § 2081 (Supp. 1948); N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 240 (1944).
Is icH. STAT. AN . § 1401 (Henderson 1938).
'9 Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 847.20 (Cum. Supp. 1948); N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT
§§193 (2), (4) (1939); N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §240 (1944).
20 Ellis v, Chicago & N. W. Ry., 167 Wis. 392, 167 N. W. 1048 (1918);
WIs. STAT. §§ 263.15 (1), (2) (1947); Wis. STAT. §§260.19 (3), (4) (1947).
1948]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Under present Ohio law, there is no right of contribution among
any tortfeasors. 21 The doctrine of contribution among negligent co-
tortfeasors which was given express sanction in 1845 in the case of
Acheson v. Miller 2 2 has today evidently vanished without ever being
expressly repudiated.
This seeming atavism is explained by Professor Prosser as hav-
ing resulted from the confusion, by the Ohio courts, of the concepts
of joint tort in its original sense and joint tort as used in permissive
joinder under the code reform. 3
Such being the condition of the law on this subject, it is not
surprising that the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws should
draft a uniform act in an effort at rectification. The Uniform Con-
tribution Among Tortfeasors Act was submitted in 1939, and has
been adopted, to date, by five states -1 and the Territory of Hawaii. -1
The Act begins by defining joint tortfeasors as "two or more
persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to
person or property, whether or not judgment has been recovered
against all or some of them." The purpose of the last clause of the
definition is to disapprove the policy of making a joint and several
judgment a necessary prerequisite to the recovery of contribution,
as is explicit in the joint tortfeasor acts of some states.- 3 "The com-
mon obligation contemplated by this act is the common liability of
the tortfeasor to suffer adverse judgment at the instance of the in-
jured person, whether or not the injured person elects to impose
it." 17 It will be seen that the wilful tortfeasor fits into the above
definition and purposefully so. 8 Presumably, this inclusion of the
wilful tortfeasor within the definition coupled with the statement
of Section 2 (1) that "the right of contribution exists among joint
tortfeasors" gives to the wilful tortfeasor all the benefits which in-
ure under the Act. However, should the derelictions of a tortfeasor
in a particular case prove too shocking, the drafters of the Act sug-
gest that the court could in its discretion refuse to allow such tort-
feasor to participate under the Act.21 The case of the wilful tort-
21 Maryland Cas. Co. v. Gough, 146 Ohio St. 305, 65 N.E. 2d 858 (1946).
222 Ohio St. 203, 59 Am. Dec. 663 (1855), overruling Acheson v. Miller,
18 Ohio 5 (1849).
23 PROSSER, TORTS 1093 (1941).
24. ARK. DIG. STAT. § 611 (Cum Supp. 1944); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS
art. 50, § § 21-30 (Supp. 1947); N. M. STAT. ANW. § § 21.118-125 (1941); R. I.
GEN. LAWS c. 940 (1940); S. D. Sess. Laws c. 167 (1945).
2
5 HAwAI REV. LAWS § § 10487-10493 (1945).
2G See note 16 supra.
27 9 UNiToRm LAWS Aix. 161, § 1 Comm'rs' Notes (1942).
28 Id. at 162, § 2 Comm'rs' Notes, (1).
29 Shultz v. Young, 205 Ark. 533, 169 S. W. 2d 648 (1943); Gregory,




feasor could be administered more expeditiously in this manner
than by, say, inserting a clause excluding from the Act the culpable
actors in torts involving moral turpitude; the term "moral turpi-
tude" and similar general terms are ones almost impossible of defi-
nition.
A suit for contribution would not be in order ... until he [the
tortfeasor] has by payment discharged the common liability or has
paid more than his pro rata share thereof." 30
Section 2 (3) entitles a tortfeasor who has entered into a settle-
ment with the injured party to contribution, but only if by virtue of
that settlement his co-tortfeasor also was released. For example, the
purchaser of a personal covenant not to sue shall not be entitled to
contribution.31
Section 2 (4) which deals with the doctrine of proportional
fault, is inclosed within brackets to indicate that its adoption is
optional and that its omission will not undermine the purport of the
Act.32 Subsection (4) provides that when disproportional degrees
of fault are among the issues in the suit for contribution, the court
may submit that issue to the jury, but only when the issue is
properly brought into litigation $1 and the court finds that from the
evidence there is indication of such disproportion.
Sections 4 and 5 treat the problem of releases. Section 4 con-
siders the effect of releases on the injured person's claim and
changes the common law of most forums,"4 in that releases, absent
contrary specific provisions, do not discharge the other co-tortfeas-
ors. They merely reduce the total joint obligation by the amount
paid for each release or by a stated proportion (not less than the
consideration paid for each release) contained in the release. For
instance X, one of three co-tortfeasors, may enter into a contract
of release with A, who suffered damages to the extent of $3000 and,
disregarding any doctrine of proportional fault, X for a considera-
tion of $1000 may induce A to release 50% of his total claim against
X, Y and Z, the co-tortfeasors. But using same example, X may not
effectuate a contract for his release with A, paying a consideration
of $1000 and stating in the release that it has reduced the total
claim by only 25%. In no event need the remaining co-tortfeasors
pay A more than $2000. The release is treated under this Act much
the same as the covenant not to sue.3 5
30 9 UNiuomvi LAWS ANN. 162, § 2 (2) (1942).
31id. Comm'rs' Notes (3).
3 2Maryland does not include § 2 (4), MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art.
50, § § 21-30 (Supp. 1947).
33 9 UNIFoRm LAWS ANN. 164, § 7 (5) (1942).
3 4
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Section 5 considers the effect of releases on the right of contri-
bution. The released tortfeasor is still liable to his co-tortfeasor for
contribution unless the release provides that the remaining co-tort-
feasors are relieved from the released tortfeasor's pro rata share of
liability. This negatives the possibility that the remaining co-tort-
feasors might be prejudiced by collusion between the injured party
and the released tortfeasor. Thus A, the injured party, cannot by
executing a release to X, the co-tortfeasor, for a nominal considera-
tion prevent X from being liable for contribution to his co-tort-
feasors, Y and Z, unless he includes in the release the provision
'that Y and Z are to be liable only for two-thirds of A's original
claim. The doctrine of proportional liability is disregarded in the
last example, also.
A third party practice act is contained in Section 7 which is
virtually identical to the original Rule 14, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, now amended.16 This section is bracketed, designating
optional adoption, but the state not having a third party practice act
of its own would do well to adopt Section 7. Contained therein is
the procedural machinery designed to insure the efficacy of the Act.
Using Section 7, the tortfeasor who is to be amerced can, by filing
a bill of impleader, bring into the same action his co-tortfeasor, who
will be liable to him for contribution, and have that issue settled
in the same action.
No significant body of litigation has yet arisen on interpretation
of the various sections and subsections of the Act. It is to be hoped
that the state courts called upon to construe the provisions will
preserve their original context, stated so succinctly in the language
of the provisions themselves and in the very helpful annotations by
the Committee of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The Act
is an intelligent attempt to reconcile the joint tortfeasor with his
counterparts, the joint obligors in other fields of law. "Tortfeasor"
does mean wrongdoer. But "tortfeasor" is not a preclusionary
term for describing one who commits wrongs upon others. Is the
equity of the inadvertent, or even wilful, tortfeasor necessarily less
than that of the wilful breacher of contract? If not, and it seems
obviously not, the joint tortfeasor is getting unjustifiably harsh
treatment in most of our courts of justice. Further, this harsh treat-
ment can be directly traced to its source, a case decided in 1799 by
the Court of the King's Bench in England which, as dictum, either
incorrectly stated a proposition of law or correctly stated a proposi-
tion which was later garbled.
Donald W. Fisher
3 6 FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (West Rev. ed. 1947).
[Vol. 9
